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Casenote
New Standard Used
For Equal Protection
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre,
476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973).
EDITOR'S NOTE-After this casenote was set in type, the United
States Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 42
U.S.L.W. 4475 (U.S. April 2, 1974), reversed the second circuit's
holding which this article suggests had posited an unduly liberal
interpretation of a strengthened rational basis test for equal pro-
tection. The primary basis for the Supreme Court's decision, how-
ever, was that the single-family dwelling ordinance in controversy
was a proper legislative device for regulation of land use. This
analysis was facilitated by the fact that the tenants whose rights
were at issue had quit the premises and only the denial of the
lessor's rights to equal protection of the laws remained at issue-
more clearly a commercial interest subject to the traditional ra-
tional basis test of equal protection. In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Brennan stated that he felt the case was moot.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre' sanctioned a new standard to gov-
ern the application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.2 Faced with an exclusionary zoning ordinance,3 the
court abandoned the rigid two-tiered equal protection approach in
favor of a test directed toward determining whether the legisla-
tive classification was in fact substantially related to the ordi-
nance's objective. As a result of applying this interpretation, the
court found the zoning ordinance unconstitutional. This note will
1. 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
3. An exclusionary zone operates to exclude certain persons and land
uses from a particular neighborhood or municipality. Methods em-
ployed to reach this result include zoning and subdivision regulations
to make development prohibitively expensive; regulations designed
to prohibit certain land uses; and regulations to limit the number
of persons which may occupy a dwelling. For commentary on such
devices, see generally Bingham & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Prac-
tices: An Examination of the Current Controversy, 25 VAND. L. REV.
1111 (1972); Note, Exclusionary Zoning & Equal Protection, 84 HAnv.
L. REv. 1645 (1971).
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examine whether the court's test was correct in light of recent
United States Supreme Court decisions construing the equal pro-
tection clause.
Owners of a residential dwelling and three of six students who
leased it brought the action in Boraas in federal district court
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 4 The students,
although unrelated, were organized and functioned as a single
housekeeping unit, sharing rental expenses. The defendant Vil-
lage of Belle Terre ("Village") is a small suburban municipality
zoned exclusively for one-family residential dwellings. Plaintiffs
contended that the Village zoning regulation,6 which prohibited
groups of more than two unrelated persons from occupying a
single-family residence, denied them equal protection of the laws
and violated their rights of association, privacy and travel. There-
fore, they sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and
a declaratory judgment invalidating the ordinance.
The lower court 6 denied plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief
and upheld the validity of the zoning ordinance as a rationally-
based exercise of the Village's interest in protecting the nuclear
family.7 In reaching this decision, the lower court considered the
smallness of the Village, the absence of similar exclusionary zones
in nearby communities and the existence of student dormitory ac-
commodations as factors sufficient to sustain the ordinance.
On appeal to the second circuit the litigants keyed their argu-
ments to the two-tiered standard of equal protection. The two-
tiered approach, as established by the United States Supreme
Court, contemplates two standards for review of legislative classi-
fications challenged on equal protection grounds. The first tier, a
minimal scrutiny, rational basis test, has been applied tradition-
4. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, reg-
ulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by theConstitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injuredin an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
5. BELLE TERRE, N.Y., BLDG. ZONE ORDNANcE art. I, sec. D 1.35a (1970).
6. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, No. 72C-1030 Memorandum Incorpo-
rating Findings of Fact and Order (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
7. Such zoning is simply another of the countless statutes ofbounty and protection with which the states, and all of them,
and the Federal government alike aggressively surround the
traditional family of parents and their children, reaching fromfamily court laws, through laws of inheritance to tax laws.
Id. at 31.
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ally in the fields of economic and social legislation. 8 The Village
asserted that this level of analysis was appropriate in this case.
Under this test, legislative bodies are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power if any state of facts may be
reasonably conceived to justify the classification.9 The Village
asserted that since such facts existed, a rational basis for the con-
tested ordinance was established and equal protection was not
denied. Conversely, the plaintiffs contended that the Village or-
dinance should be evaluated on the basis of the second level of
the two-tiered test. This tier requires that, to be sustained as
constitutional, the challenged legislative classification must be
strictly scrutinized, the court requiring the legislative body to
demonstrate a compelling interest in the continued existence of its
legislation. This level of the two-tiered approach has been sanc-
tioned by the Supreme Court as appropriate if the classification is
based on criteria recognized as suspect,10 or if the statutory regula-
tion affects a fundamental right." Plaintiffs alleged that the Vil-
lage ordinance impinged on their fundamental rights of privacy,
association and travel and as such should have been strictly scru-
tinized. Thus, the second circuit was presented clear-cut alter-
native arguments on which to base its decision. This rigid either-
or choice associated with the two-tiered test, however, posed a di-
lemma for the court.
The court found 2 that, despite incidental effects, the zoning
8. See Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Kotch v. Board of
River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
9. The principal cases cited in support of the rational basis test for equal
protection are: McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) ("A stat-
utory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts rea-
sonably may be conceived to justify it." Id. at 426 (emphasis ad-
ded) ), and Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911)
("A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend
against the clause merely because it is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." Id. at
78).
10. Classifications recognized as suspect have been those determined by
accident of birth, such as: sex, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (Brennan, J., writing for a plurality, joined by Douglas, Mar-
shall & White, JJ.); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971); race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); national
origin, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
11. Fundamental rights recognized by the Court include: marriage, Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); right to privacy, Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); right to vote, Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); criminal appeals, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12(1956); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
12. 476 F.2d at 813-14.
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ordinance neither denied fundamental rights" nor created a sus-
pect classification.14 Furthermore, the court recognized that the
two-tiered test had become very rigid in its application. If the in-
terest affected by a particular legislative classification did not
reach the fundamental right or suspect classification levels, the in-
dividual interest would yield to the legislation. The court, how-
ever, indicated that the rights claimed by the homeowner and stu-
dents were more personal and basic than the commercial interests
traditionally associated with the minimal scrutiny standard.15
Thus, the court seemed prepared to require that the Village dem-
onstrate a greater interest than mere rationality to sustain its ordi-
nance.
Apparently unable to invalidate the ordinance within the
framework of the Supreme Court's two-tiered criteria, the second
circuit noted similar exclusionary zoning ordinances were not un-
common and referred to regulations subject to prior litigation in
other courts.' 6 The court especially noted similarity between the
municipalities' arguments in Boraas and Palo Alto Tenants Union
v. Morgan.'7 The Morgan court listed the municipality's interest
in preserving the integrity of the biological-legal family, the
greater impact of unrelated groups of persons on neighborhoods,
and the adverse economic impact of such groups pooling resources
to pay higher rentals thus driving rentals upward as ample rea-
sons to sustain a single-family dwelling ordinance.'8  The ma-
13. Commentators, however, have argued that the fundamental rights
characterization should be extended to include exclusionary zoning.
See generally Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAxr. L. REv. 767 (1969); Note, The
Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and
Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971).
14. A commentator has persuasively written in support of extending the
status of suspect classification to legislative regulations differentiating
between communal "family groups" and the traditional socio-legal
family. See Comment, All in the "Family:" Legal Problems of Com-
munes, 7 HARv. Cr,. RiGsTs-Cwv. LiB. L. REv. 393 (1972).
15. 476 F.2d at 813-14.
16. See Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242(1962); Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. Margate City, 112 N.J. Super.
341, 271 A.2d 430 (1970).
17. 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
18. Findings of unconstitutionality in cases involving zoning ordinances
are less than commonplace. Since nearly every local zoning ordi-
nance represents a restriction upon rights to use of land, some party
will invariably claim denial of a constitutional right. This charac-
teristic of zoning may have prompted the courts, led by the Supreme
Court in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), to his-
torically allow municipalities broad discretion in enacting zoning or-
dinances. Nearly the only requirement placed upon a zoning regula-
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jority of the second circuit, however, found these same reasons
unpersuasive.19 Yet, the court still seemed to lack a means to in-
validate the ordinance within the two-tiered test.
The means by which the second circuit resolved this problem
and ultimately found the zoning ordinance unconstitutional were
embodied in the following language.
Fortunately we do not have to decide whether there has been an
infringement of the right of privacy or travel because we believe
that we are no longer limited to the either-or choice between the
compelling state interest test and the minimal scrutiny permitted
by the Lindsley-McGowan formula. Faced recently with the issue
under similar circumstances the Supreme Court appears to have
moved from this rigid dichotomy ... toward a more flexible and
equitable approach .... 20
In this shifting analysis by the Supreme Court of equal protection
cases, the majority of the second circuit perceived an intermedi-
ate ground to the mere rationality or strict scrutiny review of the
two-tiered approach. The majority stated its equal protection test
as requiring
consideration to be given to evidence of the nature of the unequal
classification under attack, the nature of the rights adversely af-
fected, and the governmental interest urged in support of it. Un-
der this approach the test . . . is whether the legislative classifi-
cation is in fact substantially related to the object of the statute. 21
The majority-formulation of the applicable test for equal pro-
tection in Boraas was attacked by Judge Timbers in a strong dis-
senting opinion. Timbers wrote that he felt that the majority
was applying a "sliding scale" test for equal protection-the more
valuable the right, the stricter the scrutiny.22 Timbers feared the
"sliding scale" approach would confer excessive discretion upon a
judge to overturn challenged legislation. 23  He interpreted recent
tion is that it bear a "substantial relation" to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare. See also Carmichael v. Southern Coal
& Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); Zahn v. Board of Public Works,
274 U.S. 325 (1927); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
19. 476 F.2d at 816-17 (2d Cir. 1973). The court seemed to favor the
reasoning of City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 IlI. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d
116 (1966). In Trottner, which concerned limitation of population
density and traffic control by excluding groups of unrelated persons,
the court stated that "none of these observations reflects a universal
truth. Family groups are mobile today, and not all family units are
internally stable and well-disciplined. Family groups with two or
more cars are not unfamiliar." Id. at 437, 216 N.E.2d at 119.
20. 476 F.2d at 814.
21. Id. (emphasis original).
22. Id. at 821.
23. Such a "sliding scale" test would present to the court "the impossi-
EQUAL PROTECTION
Supreme Court cases which seemed to depart from a strict two-
tiered test as indicative of the Court's desire to eliminate the abil-
ity of the state to sustain legislation on the basis of rationaliza-
tions created by judicial hypothesis. Timbers felt that in the place
of the mere rationality test, the Supreme Court had substituted the
requirement that legislative means must have a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation.24  Based on such a
formulation and his acceptance of the Village's contention that the
zoning ordinance bore a fair and substantial relationship to the
maintenance of the traditional family character of the Village,
Judge Timbers would have sustained the Belle Terre zoning ordi-
nance.
25
The Supreme Court's shifting interpretation of the two-tiered
equal protection test, to which the second circuit refers, orig-
inated during the 1971-72 term. Instead of showing satisfaction
with the traditional "mere rationality" test of the first tier, the
Supreme Court seemed to be pointing toward a "rationality-plus"
or "means-scrutiny" test.26 The Court indicated that a legisla-
tive body, to sustain its regulation, would have to show greater
evidence of the rationality of a classification, especially when the
regulation affected personal rights. The Court insisted that the
classification and the unequal treatment of groups must rest on
some ground rationally explained and having a significant, fair
or substantial relationship to the purpose or object of the stat-
ute.2 7 Exemplary of the Burger Court's support for a streng-
ble task of first assessing the precise value of a right or interest and
then increasing or decreasing the intensity of its scrutiny accord-
ingly." Id.
24. Id. at 821-22.
25. The split within the second circuit in deciding Boraas is reflected
in that upon the majority reaching its decision, one of the second
circuit Judges requested a poll for rehearing en banc. This resulted
in a 4-4 tie. Judge Timbers again filed a dissenting opinion based
on his apprehension that the court had misconstrued the Supreme
Court's decisions.
26. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreward: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal
Protection, 86 HIsv. L. REv. 1 (1972). Professor Gunther may have
supplied the Boraas court with its rationale to escape the two-tiered
dilemma. In any case, the article may be the source of emerging
discussion regarding a new doctrine of equal protection. Gunther de-
fines his "means-scrutiny" model as follows, "that the legislative
means must substantially further legislative ends." Id. at 20.
27. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) ("The question for
our determination in this case is whether there is some ground of
difference that rationally explains the different treatment .... " Id.
at 447); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) ("[T]he equal protec-
tion clause 'imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature
318 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 2 (1974)
thened rationality test is Reed v. Reed 28 which concerned the
validity of an Idaho statute giving preference to male over female
administrators of an intestate's estate:
A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial re-
lation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike. 29
This formulation is only a departure in degree from the tradi-
tional rational basis standard of the first tier of the two-tiered
test, but it led the second circuit to considerable speculation re-
garding the emergence of a strengthened rational basis test for
equal protection.
To ascertain whether the second circuit correctly perceived the
dimensions of any shift in the Supreme Court's application of the
equal protection clause, Court opinions subsequent to Boraas
should be examined. Although the number of equal protection
decisions issued during the 1972-73 term was smaller than the
prior term, a prominent feature of the cases was the Court's re-
tention of the rhetoric of the two-tiered standard. Justice Powell,
in the leading equal protection case of the term,30 set forth the
analytical framework for the Court's evaluation of the Texas
system for public school finance as follows:
We must decide, first, whether, the Texas system of financing pub-
lic education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class
or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly pro-
tected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scru-
tiny.31
Failing to find a clearly defined suspect class disadvantaged by
the finance system and also finding education not among those
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court
found no reason to apply the strict scrutiny test of the second
tier. Rather, the Court proceeded to subject the legislative plan
of the class singled out.'" Id. at 140, quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384
U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966) ); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972) ("The inferior classification of dependent unacknowledged
illegitimates bears . . .no significant relationship to those recognized
purposes .... ." Id. at 175); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) ("A
classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation .... " Id. at 76) (in each quotation em-
phasis added).
28. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
29. Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415(1920) ) (emphasis added).
30. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
31. Id. at 17.
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to an equal protection test closely resembling the traditional
standard of first-tier rational basis.
[T]he Texas scheme must still be examined to determine whether
it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose
and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination. 2
While the Court upheld the validity of the Texas system, it is
clear that it did not do so based on a rational justification estab-
lished by judicial hypothesis. Rather, the Court assessed the ra-
tionality of the finance plan in terms of legislative purposes hav-
ing substantial basis in actuality.
The Court, earlier in the term speaking again through Jus-
tice Powell in evaluating New York's system of granting good
time credit for pre-trial incarceration to certain prisoners while
denying it to others, had expressed in the exact words as quoted
above a strengthened formulation of the traditional standard for
equal protection.
We do not wish to inhibit state experimental classifications in a
practical and troublesome area [corrections], but inquire only
whether the challenged distinction rationally furthers some legiti-
mate, articulated state purpose .... We have supplied no imag-
inary basis or purpose for this statutory scheme, but we likewise
refuse to discard a clear and legitimate purpose .... 33
These two cases tend to demonstrate that the Court, even in sus-
taining legislative classifications by its strengthened rational ba-
sis test, will not do so based on judicial hypothesis but must ascer-
tain clearly stated existing purposes for the continued existence of
legislation.
A notable exception to the Court's tendency during the past-
term to uphold legislative classifications challenged on equal pro-
tection grounds, which further illustrates a strengthened ration-
ality test, is United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.84
In this case, the Court rejected the government's contention that
the contested legislative classification might have been intended
to prevent fraud, when the legislative history showed the purpose
was to prevent "hippie communes" from participating in the food
stamp program. Thus, in Moreno a hypothetical rational basis for
the classification, which fraud could have been, did not satisfy the
first-tier rational basis test. Because the articulated purpose re-
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270-77 (1973).
34. 413 U.S. 528 (1973), involving a Congressional classification denying
food stamp benefits to non-related individuals residing together, but
granting such benefits to related individuals living in groups.
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vealed by the legislative history was not legitimate, the Court in-
validated the legislation.
These three cases, among the more notable equal protection de-
cisions of the past term, do tend to support the argument that the
traditional mere rationality test of the first tier now means more
than routine validation of challenged legislation by rationaliza-
tions based on judicial hypothesis. This subtle shift, however,
does not mean a majority of the Court is willing to abandon the
two-tiered analysis.
During the 1972-73 term, only Justices Marshall and Douglass5
and possibly Justice White3 6 were prepared to accept a "sliding
scale" approach regarding equal protection, that is, exercising
stricter scrutiny as the societal and constitutional importance of
the interest affected increased. The remainder of the Court
seemed eager to avoid the charge of ad hoc jurisprudence so
widely heard in the days of substantive due process and associated
with a "sliding scale" approach.
If these observations regarding the current status of the equal
protection "tests" acceptable to the Supreme Court are correct, all
of the members of the second circuit have correctly noted a shift
in the application of the equal protection clause. The majority
in Boraas, however, may have applied too broad an interpretation
of this movement in holding the Village ordinance invalid. The
asserted purpose for the ordinance, preservation of the traditional
family character of the Village, should satisfy the strengthened
rationality test as a classification furthering some legitimate ar-
ticulated state purpose. As such, the Boraas decision is likely to
be reversed by the United States Supreme Court.
Paul Schudel '75
35. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
70 (1973) (Marshall & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
36. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 456 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
